The contract as control instrument in inter-company relations. Analysis from the economic theory of the firm
The aim of this paper is to analyze the contract as a control instrument in inter-firm relations from a theoretical point of view. The proposed solution has improved the factors involve in the firm decision to interact with others and has had a better understanding regarding the nature of economic a...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Entreciencias: diálogos en la sociedad del conocimiento |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/62095 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unam.mx/index.php/entreciencias/article/view/62095 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | transaction cost opportunism dynamic capabilities trust cognitive complementary relational risks. costos de transacción oportunismo capacidades dinámicas confianza complementariedad cognitiva riesgos relacionales. |
| Sumario: | The aim of this paper is to analyze the contract as a control instrument in inter-firm relations from a theoretical point of view. The proposed solution has improved the factors involve in the firm decision to interact with others and has had a better understanding regarding the nature of economic agents and knowledge, the contract is becoming a forgotten control device, however, its importance in broad sense remains. The study was carried out based on Coase, Williamson, Langlios, Sako and Nootebom proposals. |
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