DELIBERATION, ACTION AND NORMATIVITY. Comments on Martin Seel’s “The Ability to Deliberate”
In this paper I comment on several aspects of Martin Seel’s paper “The Ability to Deliberate”, mainly on his claims that deliberation is a form of action, on his not very clear distinction between deliberation and thought, and on the relation between normativity and deliberation. There are also some...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2009 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
| Repositorio: | Redalyc-UNAM |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:redalyc.org:323028512006 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=323028512006 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofía reasons normativity Deliberation practical reasoning theoretical reasoning |
| Sumario: | In this paper I comment on several aspects of Martin Seel’s paper “The Ability to Deliberate”, mainly on his claims that deliberation is a form of action, on his not very clear distinction between deliberation and thought, and on the relation between normativity and deliberation. There are also some comments on practical and theoretical reasoning, as well as on Seel’s characterization of reasons. |
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