On deontic truth and values
This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended byAlchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestiveconception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalentto thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they def...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Digital de la UPF |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/59575 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/59575 http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2017.181 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Alchourrón-bulygin Ethical relativism Ethical constructivism Burdenof proof Particularism |
| Sumario: | This article analyzes the thesis of ethical relativism, as defended byAlchourrón and Bulygin (1983). These authors offer, on the one hand, a suggestiveconception according to which the question “what are our obligations?” is equivalentto thinking about what is to be done; on the other hand, they defend a relativistconception of ethics. They present three objections to constructivist accounts ofethics that are not relativist: a) the argument of the burden of theproof; b) aversion of the dilemma of Euthyphro, and c) the argument of particularism. Thisarticle presents counterarguments to these objections in the attempt to show thatthey are not conclusive and that a space therefore remains for objectivity in thenormative sphere. |
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