Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?

Recent empirical evidence shows that working in an unsupervised, isolated situation under competition, can increase dishonest behavior to achieve prestige. However, could working in a common space, in the presence of colleagues affect cheating? Here, we examine how familiar peer influence, supervisi...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Pascual Ezama, David, Dunfield, Derek, Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz, Prelec, Drazen
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2015
País:España
Institución:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
Repositorio:Docta Complutense
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/23725
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/23725
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Work environment
Ethics
Psicología (Psicología)
Ética
61 Psicología
71 Ética
id ES_ff1dc2e50da81a2dab81dec55e395f8a
oai_identifier_str oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/23725
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?Pascual Ezama, DavidDunfield, DerekGil-Gómez de Liaño, BeatrizPrelec, DrazenWork environmentEthicsPsicología (Psicología)Ética61 Psicología71 ÉticaRecent empirical evidence shows that working in an unsupervised, isolated situation under competition, can increase dishonest behavior to achieve prestige. However, could working in a common space, in the presence of colleagues affect cheating? Here, we examine how familiar peer influence, supervision and social incentives affect worker performance and dishonest behavior. First, we show that working in the presence of peers is an effective mechanism to constrain honest/dishonest behavior compared to an isolated work situation (experiment 1). Second, we demonstrate that the mere suspicion of dishonesty from another peer is not enough to affect individual cheating behavior (experiment 2), suggesting that reputation holds great importance in a worker’s self-image acting as a strong social incentives. Third, we show that when the suspicion of dishonesty increases with multiple peers behaving dishonestly, the desire to increase standing is sufficient to nudge individuals’ behavior back to cheating at the same levels as isolated situations (experiment 3).Public Library of ScienceUniversidad Complutense de Madrid20152015-04-0820152015-04-08journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/23725reponame:Docta Complutenseinstname:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)Inglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Atribución 3.0 Españahttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/237252026-06-02T12:44:21Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?
title Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?
spellingShingle Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?
Pascual Ezama, David
Work environment
Ethics
Psicología (Psicología)
Ética
61 Psicología
71 Ética
title_short Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?
title_full Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?
title_fullStr Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?
title_full_unstemmed Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?
title_sort Peer effects in unethical behavior: standing or reputation?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pascual Ezama, David
Dunfield, Derek
Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz
Prelec, Drazen
author Pascual Ezama, David
author_facet Pascual Ezama, David
Dunfield, Derek
Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz
Prelec, Drazen
author_role author
author2 Dunfield, Derek
Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Beatriz
Prelec, Drazen
author2_role author
author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Complutense de Madrid
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Work environment
Ethics
Psicología (Psicología)
Ética
61 Psicología
71 Ética
topic Work environment
Ethics
Psicología (Psicología)
Ética
61 Psicología
71 Ética
description Recent empirical evidence shows that working in an unsupervised, isolated situation under competition, can increase dishonest behavior to achieve prestige. However, could working in a common space, in the presence of colleagues affect cheating? Here, we examine how familiar peer influence, supervision and social incentives affect worker performance and dishonest behavior. First, we show that working in the presence of peers is an effective mechanism to constrain honest/dishonest behavior compared to an isolated work situation (experiment 1). Second, we demonstrate that the mere suspicion of dishonesty from another peer is not enough to affect individual cheating behavior (experiment 2), suggesting that reputation holds great importance in a worker’s self-image acting as a strong social incentives. Third, we show that when the suspicion of dishonesty increases with multiple peers behaving dishonestly, the desire to increase standing is sufficient to nudge individuals’ behavior back to cheating at the same levels as isolated situations (experiment 3).
publishDate 2015
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2015
2015-04-08
2015
2015-04-08
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/23725
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/23725
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Atribución 3.0 España
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Atribución 3.0 España
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Public Library of Science
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Public Library of Science
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Docta Complutense
instname:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
instname_str Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
reponame_str Docta Complutense
collection Docta Complutense
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869425745648943104
score 15,301603

Similares en LA Referencia