El valor y el bien como objetos de la intencionalidad en Max Scheler

This paper studies affective intentionality in Max Scheler, showing that the “phenomenology of values” does not only deal with values but also includes a complete theory of the good. In this theory, Scheler performs a genetic analysis that begins with the <em>Sache </em>(understood as &l...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Fernández-Beites, P. (Pilar)|||/items/8faa5709-97f4-48c5-a2d5-e8c655483f6e
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Navarra
Repositorio:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
Idioma:español
OAI Identifier:oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/65129
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10171/65129
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Heidegger
pragmatismo
Sache
Ding
Descripción
Sumario:This paper studies affective intentionality in Max Scheler, showing that the “phenomenology of values” does not only deal with values but also includes a complete theory of the good. In this theory, Scheler performs a genetic analysis that begins with the <em>Sache </em>(understood as <em>wertvolles Ding</em>, valuable thing) in order to defi ne the notions of <em>Ding </em>(theoretical thing) and <em>Gut </em>(the good), understood as <em>Wertding </em>(thing of value). This approach indicates the possibility of improving on classic descriptions of the good and offers an interesting alternative to current “pragmatist” proposals.