Medieval corporations, membership and the common good : rethinking the critique of shareholder primacy

The notion that business corporations should be managed for the exclusive benefit of shareholders has been widely challenged. In particular, critics have argued that directors are authorised to serve the interests of the corporation: a legal entity that is completely separate from its shareholders....

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Mansell, Samuel F.|||/items/7362ab03-aa3e-435a-8b82-75d7c088f5b0, Sison, A.J. (Alejo José)|||/items/801ed2fe-d396-40df-9a68-74fd1b269c69
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2020
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Navarra
Repositorio:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/64435
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10171/64435
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Membership
Shareholder
Medieval Corporations
Common Good
Descripción
Sumario:The notion that business corporations should be managed for the exclusive benefit of shareholders has been widely challenged. In particular, critics have argued that directors are authorised to serve the interests of the corporation: a legal entity that is completely separate from its shareholders. However, the premise that shareholders have sole legitimate claim to ‘membership’ has rarely been questioned. This article explores medieval thought on ownership, authority and participation in guilds, churches, towns and universities, and shows that membership can be understood as participation in, and shared responsibility for, a group’s distinct collaborative activity over time. Our theory suggests that ‘membership’ in the modern corporation extends to non-shareholding stakeholders, but with the implication that ownership and authority are vested in the members as a body and not in a separate entity.