Pluralism and global justice
A central question in the debate surrounding contemporary proposals for a new international order is whether accepting the fact of global pluralism should lead us to lower our ambitions for global justice. Many participants in that debate answer such a question positively. Even authors such as Rawls...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:68892 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/68892 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.5565/rev/enrahonar/v46.190 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Cosmopolitanisme Justícia global Globalització Drets humans Consens per solapament Pluralisme Cosmopolitanism Global justice Globalization Habermas Human rights Overlapping consensos Pluralism Rawls Cosmopolitanismo Justicia global Globalización Derechos humanos Consenso por solapamiento Pluralismo |
| Sumario: | A central question in the debate surrounding contemporary proposals for a new international order is whether accepting the fact of global pluralism should lead us to lower our ambitions for global justice. Many participants in that debate answer such a question positively. Even authors such as Rawls and Habermas both prominent defenders of ambitious conceptions of domestic justice seem to reach the same pessimistic conclusion with their respective proposals for a new international order. In this paper, I question the plausibility of such a conclusion on the basis of an analysis of the cosmopolitan project that Habermas articulates in recent publications. I argue that his presentation of the project oscillates between two models. The first is an ambitious model for a future international order geared towards fulfilling the human rights goals of the UN Charter. The second is a minimalist model, in which the international community's obligation to protect human rights is limited to the negative duty of preventing wars of aggression and massive human rights violations stemming from armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. According to this model, any more ambitious goals should be left to a global domestic politics, which would have to come about through negotiated compromises among domesticated major powers at the transnational level. I defend the ambitious model by arguing that there is no plausible basis for drawing a normatively significant distinction between massive human rights violations stemming from armed conflicts and those stemming from regulations of the global economic order. If this is correct, acceptance of the fact of global pluralism does not offer a plausible justification to exclude economic justice from the principles of transnational justice recognized by the international community. |
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