Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises

In this paper, I develop and defend an “identity premise” response to Paul Boghossian’s argument from inference. According to this argument, externalism about mental content is incompatible with a substantial notion of self-knowledge because it happens to be incompatible with the claim that we can k...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Garmendia Mujika, Ekain
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2014
País:España
Institución:Universidad del País Vasco
Repositorio:Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
OAI Identifier:oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/65607
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10810/65607
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Semantic Externalism
Inference
Epistemic Transparency
Rationality
Boghossian
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spelling Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity PremisesGarmendia Mujika, EkainSemantic ExternalismInferenceEpistemic TransparencyRationalityBoghossianIn this paper, I develop and defend an “identity premise” response to Paul Boghossian’s argument from inference. According to this argument, externalism about mental content is incompatible with a substantial notion of self-knowledge because it happens to be incompatible with the claim that we can know a priori the logical properties of our thoughts. Here, I defend the identity premise response against four different criticisms, and to do so, I sketch the general lines for a picture on inference-engaging and rational explanation.FFI2011 – 29560-C02-01Universidad de Granada202420242014info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10810/65607reponame:Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigacióninstname:Universidad del País VascoInglésinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/(c) 2014 El autor bajo una Creative Commons License (CC BY-NC)oai:addi.ehu.eus:10810/656072026-06-18T09:23:17Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
title Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
spellingShingle Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
Garmendia Mujika, Ekain
Semantic Externalism
Inference
Epistemic Transparency
Rationality
Boghossian
title_short Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
title_full Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
title_fullStr Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
title_full_unstemmed Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
title_sort Externalism, Rational Explanation, Identity Premises
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Garmendia Mujika, Ekain
author Garmendia Mujika, Ekain
author_facet Garmendia Mujika, Ekain
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Semantic Externalism
Inference
Epistemic Transparency
Rationality
Boghossian
topic Semantic Externalism
Inference
Epistemic Transparency
Rationality
Boghossian
description In this paper, I develop and defend an “identity premise” response to Paul Boghossian’s argument from inference. According to this argument, externalism about mental content is incompatible with a substantial notion of self-knowledge because it happens to be incompatible with the claim that we can know a priori the logical properties of our thoughts. Here, I defend the identity premise response against four different criticisms, and to do so, I sketch the general lines for a picture on inference-engaging and rational explanation.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2014
2024
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10810/65607
url http://hdl.handle.net/10810/65607
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
(c) 2014 El autor bajo una Creative Commons License (CC BY-NC)
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
(c) 2014 El autor bajo una Creative Commons License (CC BY-NC)
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de Granada
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de Granada
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
instname:Universidad del País Vasco
instname_str Universidad del País Vasco
reponame_str Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
collection Addi. Archivo Digital para la Docencia y la Investigación
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,812429

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