Overcoming Positivism: Husserl and Wittgenstein
In this paper I shall briefly analyze Husserl´s and Wittgenstein´s divergent reactions against the positivist stance on natural science and on the new cultural role that philosophy should play in relation to science. To a great extent, their philosophies can be considered as a departure from positiv...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/103978 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103978 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | 165.2 165.32 Science Truth Radical agnosticism Models Language grammar Historicism Ideality Humanidades Filosofía Teoría del conocimiento 72 Filosofía 7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento 7201.02 Epistemología 7205 Filosofía de la Ciencia |
| Sumario: | In this paper I shall briefly analyze Husserl´s and Wittgenstein´s divergent reactions against the positivist stance on natural science and on the new cultural role that philosophy should play in relation to science. To a great extent, their philosophies can be considered as a departure from positivism, although for quite different reasons. I shall argue that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, took positivism as a starting point that he tried to overcome from within. This endeavour led him to defend some theses of a pragmatist flavour as well as a peculiar type of radical agnosticism on ontological and epistemological issues. Husserl, however, considered that positivism was a dead-end for philosophy. Positivism has beheaded philosophy as a consequence of advancing a reductive view of science. Phenomenology is the attempt to understand the genetic and subjective processes that have ended up in an objective and scientific image of the world. |
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