Disfrute, placer y evidencia en Husserl
[EN] Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology extends the concept of truth, understood as evidence, to the affective-axiological and practical domains. This means that not only can things and the objective states of things be evident, but so too can their value and, consequently, the desire for them t...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) |
| Repositorio: | DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digital.csic.es:10261/404289 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/404289 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Phenomenology Husserl Feeling Emotion Truth Fenomenología Sentimiento Emoción Verdad Philosophical schools Emotions |
| Sumario: | [EN] Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology extends the concept of truth, understood as evidence, to the affective-axiological and practical domains. This means that not only can things and the objective states of things be evident, but so too can their value and, consequently, the desire for them to be and the will to realise them. This paper focuses on the analysis of the evident givenness of values. The article first provides a schematic presentation of Husserl’s conception of truth as evidence in his two major works, Logical Investigations and Ideas. It then proceeds to explore the notion of affective evidence, followed by an analysis of the empty forms of feeling and their corresponding forms of fulfilment. Through these analyses, it is concluded that the affective experiences of enjoyment (genießen) and pleasure (Lust) are indispensable elements in any evident value-act, just as perception and specific sensations are necessary elements in acts of theoretical evidence. |
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