A note on Lindahl equilibria and incentive comparatibility
We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a Nash equilibrium (N.E.) in a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. are L.E., but just those for which the production of the public good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and...
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| Tipo de recurso: | informe técnico |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1988 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/63872 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/63872 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Lindahl equilibria Nash equilibrium Macroeconomía Teorías económicas 5307.14 Teoría Macroeconómica 5307 Teoría Económica |
| Sumario: | We show that if there are Constant Returns to Scale in the production of the public good a) Any Lindahl equilibrium (L.E) is a Nash equilibrium (N.E.) in a price-setting game, b) not all N.E. are L.E., but just those for which the production of the public good is positive and c) the set of L.E. and Strong Equilibria coincide. However if the supply function is continuously differentiable, L.E. is never a N.E. We end the paper with some general comments about the nature of the incentive problem. |
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