La mayoría de edad como presunción "iuris tantum" de capacidad en los códigos civiles y canónicos
Civil and canonical codes have inherited the capacity-to-act system based on the definition of legal age set out in Roman law. However, a significant part of (both civil and canonical) jurisprudence alters its legal status by interpreting the rule of age of majority in a positivist sense, as a divid...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/60848 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/60848 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Capacidad Mayoría de edad Presunción iuris tantum Realismo jurídico |
| Sumario: | Civil and canonical codes have inherited the capacity-to-act system based on the definition of legal age set out in Roman law. However, a significant part of (both civil and canonical) jurisprudence alters its legal status by interpreting the rule of age of majority in a positivist sense, as a dividing line between those with capacity and those without. This approach sets up a rigid and unrealistic system in which the ‘validity’ of natural capacity is excluded once the rule of legal civil or canonical age of majority has been established. ‘Naturalistic’ perspectives have emerged in response, proposing a direct recognition of natural or tiered capacity in multiple age brackets. Apart from these opposing positions, and in line with the classical legal tradition, the legal age of majority may be read as a presumption of <i>iuris tantum</i>, thus allowing any person with natural capacity to act, with legal efficacy, in a viable and certain way. |
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