Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

We study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213, Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041, Neme, Alejandro
Formato: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:España
Recursos:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:288627
Acesso em linha:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/288627
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1111/jpet.12492
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Division Problem
Efficiency
Envy-Freeness
Individual Rationality
Single-Peaked Preferences
Strategy-Proofness
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spelling Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenousBergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041Neme, AlejandroDivision ProblemEfficiencyEnvy-FreenessIndividual RationalitySingle-Peaked PreferencesStrategy-ProofnessWe study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good. We study andcharacterize two individually rational and efficientfamilies of rules, whenever agents' preferences aresymmetric single-peaked on the set of possibleallotments. Rules in the two families are in additionenvy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness isconsidered on losses or on awards. Our main resultstates that (a) the family of constrained equal lossesrules coincides with the class of all individuallyrational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrainedequal awards rules coincides with the class of all in-dividually rational and efficient rules that satisfyenvy-freeness on awards. 22021-01-0120212021-01-01Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501AMhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aainfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://ddd.uab.cat/record/288627https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1111/jpet.12492reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UABinstname:Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaInglésengAgencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 ECO2017-83534-PAgencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 ECO2017-82241-RMinisterio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 SEV-2015-0563Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2017/SGR-711open accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús Creative Commons. Es permet la reproducció total o parcial, la distribució, i la comunicació pública de l'obra, sempre que no sigui amb finalitats comercials, i sempre que es reconegui l'autoria de l'obra original. No es permet la creació d'obres derivades.https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ddd.uab.cat:2886272026-06-06T12:50:31Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
title Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
spellingShingle Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
Division Problem
Efficiency
Envy-Freeness
Individual Rationality
Single-Peaked Preferences
Strategy-Proofness
title_short Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
title_full Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
title_fullStr Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
title_full_unstemmed Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
title_sort Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Neme, Alejandro
author Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
author_facet Bergantiños, Gustavo|||0000-0003-2592-5213
Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Neme, Alejandro
author_role author
author2 Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Neme, Alejandro
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Division Problem
Efficiency
Envy-Freeness
Individual Rationality
Single-Peaked Preferences
Strategy-Proofness
topic Division Problem
Efficiency
Envy-Freeness
Individual Rationality
Single-Peaked Preferences
Strategy-Proofness
description We study individually rational rules to be used toallot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisiblegood that is freely available only in whole units. Arule is individually rational if, at each preferenceprofile, each agent finds that her allotment is at leastas good as any whole unit of the good. We study andcharacterize two individually rational and efficientfamilies of rules, whenever agents' preferences aresymmetric single-peaked on the set of possibleallotments. Rules in the two families are in additionenvy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness isconsidered on losses or on awards. Our main resultstates that (a) the family of constrained equal lossesrules coincides with the class of all individuallyrational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrainedequal awards rules coincides with the class of all in-dividually rational and efficient rules that satisfyenvy-freeness on awards.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2
2021-01-01
2021
2021-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
AM
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_ab4af688f83e57aa
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://ddd.uab.cat/record/288627
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1111/jpet.12492
url https://ddd.uab.cat/record/288627
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1111/jpet.12492
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Agencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 ECO2017-83534-P
Agencia Estatal de Investigación https://doi.org/10.13039/501100011033 ECO2017-82241-R
Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003329 SEV-2015-0563
Agència de Gestió d'Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca https://doi.org/10.13039/501100003030 2017/SGR-711
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
instname:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
instname_str Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
collection Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,301603

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