Mergers in financial services and overlending

In this paper we build a model of banking competition that considers a managerial-overconfidence setup resulting in two main findings. First, a merger between rational banks may change their behaviour in that, in post-merger conditions, they would follow the overconfident bank when they would not ha...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Peón Pose, David, Antelo Suárez, Manel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2018
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC)
Repositorio:Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:minerva.usc.gal:10347/45419
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10347/45419
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Banking efficiency
Behavioural finance
Mergers
Herding
Merger paradox
Overconfidence
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spelling Mergers in financial services and overlendingPeón Pose, DavidAntelo Suárez, ManelBanking efficiencyBehavioural financeMergersHerdingMerger paradoxOverconfidenceIn this paper we build a model of banking competition that considers a managerial-overconfidence setup resulting in two main findings. First, a merger between rational banks may change their behaviour in that, in post-merger conditions, they would follow the overconfident bank when they would not have done so pre-merger, thereby amplifying the credit boom. Second, the results overcome the merger paradox, in the sense that the merger would be profitable for participants, and thus intrinsically stable.Asociación Cuadernos de Economía (ACE)Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. Departamento de Fundamentos da Análise Económica20182018-01-0120182018-01-01journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501VoRhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10347/45419reponame:Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostelainstname:Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC)Inglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2© 2018 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Artículo publicado bajo licencia de reconocimiento de Creative Commonshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:minerva.usc.gal:10347/454192026-06-15T12:47:27Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Mergers in financial services and overlending
title Mergers in financial services and overlending
spellingShingle Mergers in financial services and overlending
Peón Pose, David
Banking efficiency
Behavioural finance
Mergers
Herding
Merger paradox
Overconfidence
title_short Mergers in financial services and overlending
title_full Mergers in financial services and overlending
title_fullStr Mergers in financial services and overlending
title_full_unstemmed Mergers in financial services and overlending
title_sort Mergers in financial services and overlending
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Peón Pose, David
Antelo Suárez, Manel
author Peón Pose, David
author_facet Peón Pose, David
Antelo Suárez, Manel
author_role author
author2 Antelo Suárez, Manel
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. Departamento de Fundamentos da Análise Económica
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Banking efficiency
Behavioural finance
Mergers
Herding
Merger paradox
Overconfidence
topic Banking efficiency
Behavioural finance
Mergers
Herding
Merger paradox
Overconfidence
description In this paper we build a model of banking competition that considers a managerial-overconfidence setup resulting in two main findings. First, a merger between rational banks may change their behaviour in that, in post-merger conditions, they would follow the overconfident bank when they would not have done so pre-merger, thereby amplifying the credit boom. Second, the results overcome the merger paradox, in the sense that the merger would be profitable for participants, and thus intrinsically stable.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018
2018-01-01
2018
2018-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
VoR
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10347/45419
url https://hdl.handle.net/10347/45419
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Asociación Cuadernos de Economía (ACE)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Asociación Cuadernos de Economía (ACE)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
instname:Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC)
instname_str Universidad de Santiago de Compostela (USC)
reponame_str Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
collection Minerva. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Santiago de Compostela
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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