Mergers in financial services and overlending
In this paper we build a model of banking competition that considers a managerial- overconfidence setup resulting in two main findings. First, a merger between rational banks may change their behaviour in that, in post-merger conditions, they would follow the overconfident bank when they would not h...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid |
| Repositorio: | Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/690832 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10486/690832 https://dx.doi.org/10.32826/cude.v42i116.80 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Banking efficiency Behavioural finance Mergers Herding Merger paradox Overconfidence Economía |
| Sumario: | In this paper we build a model of banking competition that considers a managerial- overconfidence setup resulting in two main findings. First, a merger between rational banks may change their behaviour in that, in post-merger conditions, they would follow the overconfident bank when they would not have done so pre-merger, thereby amplifying the credit boom. Second, the results overcome the merger paradox, in the sense that the merger would be profitable for participants and thus intrinsically stable |
|---|