Contexts as Shared Commitments
Contemporary semantics assumes two influential notions of context: one coming from Kaplan (1989), on which contexts are sets of predetermined parameters, and another originating in Stalnaker (1978), on which contexts are sets of propositions that are "common ground." The latter is deserved...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/99486 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/99486 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Filosofia del llenguatge Semàntica (Filosofia) Pressuposició (Lògica) Contextualisme (Filosofia) Philosophy of language Semantics (Philosophy) Presupposition (Logic) Contextualism (Philosophy) |
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Contexts as Shared CommitmentsGarcía-Carpintero, ManuelFilosofia del llenguatgeSemàntica (Filosofia)Pressuposició (Lògica)Contextualisme (Filosofia)Philosophy of languageSemantics (Philosophy)Presupposition (Logic)Contextualism (Philosophy)Contemporary semantics assumes two influential notions of context: one coming from Kaplan (1989), on which contexts are sets of predetermined parameters, and another originating in Stalnaker (1978), on which contexts are sets of propositions that are "common ground." The latter is deservedly more popular, given its flexibility in accounting for context-dependent aspects of language beyond manifest indexicals, such as epistemic modals, predicates of taste, and so on and so forth; in fact, properly dealing with demonstratives (perhaps ultimately all indexicals) requires that further flexibility. Even if we acknowledge Lewis (1980)'s point that, in a sense, Kaplanian contexts already include common ground contexts, it is better to be clear and explicit about what contexts constitutively are. Now, Stalnaker (1978, 2002, 2014) defines context-as-common-ground as a set of propositions, but recent work shows that this is not an accurate conception. The paper explains why, and provides an alternative. The main reason is that several phenomena (presuppositional treatments of pejoratives and predicates of taste, forces other than assertion) require that the common ground includes non-doxastic attitudes such as appraisals, emotions, etc. Hence the common ground should not be taken to include merely contents (propositions), but those together with attitudes concerning them: shared commitments, as I will defend.Frontiers Media2015info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/99486Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésReproducció del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01932Frontiers in Psychology, 2015, vol. 6, p. 1-13http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01932cc-by (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2015http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/esinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/994862026-05-27T06:46:51Z |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Contexts as Shared Commitments |
| title |
Contexts as Shared Commitments |
| spellingShingle |
Contexts as Shared Commitments García-Carpintero, Manuel Filosofia del llenguatge Semàntica (Filosofia) Pressuposició (Lògica) Contextualisme (Filosofia) Philosophy of language Semantics (Philosophy) Presupposition (Logic) Contextualism (Philosophy) |
| title_short |
Contexts as Shared Commitments |
| title_full |
Contexts as Shared Commitments |
| title_fullStr |
Contexts as Shared Commitments |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Contexts as Shared Commitments |
| title_sort |
Contexts as Shared Commitments |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author |
García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author_facet |
García-Carpintero, Manuel |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Filosofia del llenguatge Semàntica (Filosofia) Pressuposició (Lògica) Contextualisme (Filosofia) Philosophy of language Semantics (Philosophy) Presupposition (Logic) Contextualism (Philosophy) |
| topic |
Filosofia del llenguatge Semàntica (Filosofia) Pressuposició (Lògica) Contextualisme (Filosofia) Philosophy of language Semantics (Philosophy) Presupposition (Logic) Contextualism (Philosophy) |
| description |
Contemporary semantics assumes two influential notions of context: one coming from Kaplan (1989), on which contexts are sets of predetermined parameters, and another originating in Stalnaker (1978), on which contexts are sets of propositions that are "common ground." The latter is deservedly more popular, given its flexibility in accounting for context-dependent aspects of language beyond manifest indexicals, such as epistemic modals, predicates of taste, and so on and so forth; in fact, properly dealing with demonstratives (perhaps ultimately all indexicals) requires that further flexibility. Even if we acknowledge Lewis (1980)'s point that, in a sense, Kaplanian contexts already include common ground contexts, it is better to be clear and explicit about what contexts constitutively are. Now, Stalnaker (1978, 2002, 2014) defines context-as-common-ground as a set of propositions, but recent work shows that this is not an accurate conception. The paper explains why, and provides an alternative. The main reason is that several phenomena (presuppositional treatments of pejoratives and predicates of taste, forces other than assertion) require that the common ground includes non-doxastic attitudes such as appraisals, emotions, etc. Hence the common ground should not be taken to include merely contents (propositions), but those together with attitudes concerning them: shared commitments, as I will defend. |
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2015 |
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2015 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
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article |
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publishedVersion |
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https://hdl.handle.net/2445/99486 |
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https://hdl.handle.net/2445/99486 |
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Inglés |
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Inglés |
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Reproducció del document publicat a: http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01932 Frontiers in Psychology, 2015, vol. 6, p. 1-13 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01932 |
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cc-by (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2015 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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cc-by (c) García-Carpintero, Manuel, 2015 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/es |
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openAccess |
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application/pdf |
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Frontiers Media |
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Frontiers Media |
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Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB instname:Universidad de Barcelona |
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Universidad de Barcelona |
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