Vague Heuristics
[EN] Even when they are defined with precision, one can often read and hear judgments about the vagueness of heuristics in debates about heuristic reasoning. This opinion is not just frequent but also quite reasonable. In fact, during the 1990s, there was a certain controversy concerning this topic...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión borrador |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Salamanca (USAL) |
| Repositorio: | GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/164761 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10366/164761 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofía moral Razonamiento moral Imprecisión 7207.04 Filosofía Política |
| Sumario: | [EN] Even when they are defined with precision, one can often read and hear judgments about the vagueness of heuristics in debates about heuristic reasoning. This opinion is not just frequent but also quite reasonable. In fact, during the 1990s, there was a certain controversy concerning this topic that confronted two of the leading groups in the field of heuristic reasoning research, each of whom held very different perspectives. In the present text, we will focus on two of the papers published in Psychological Review, wherein the arguments of each of these groups were presented |
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