A Defense of Cooperative Cognition
[EN] This article explores the extent to which our deliberative culture determines our capacity to recognize relevant knowledge, to select and value epistemic authority, or to recognize the importance of individual and/or collective epistemic achievements in a deliberative context. This investigatio...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Salamanca (USAL) |
| Repositorio: | GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/164762 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10366/164762 |
| Access Level: | acceso embargado |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofía política 7207.04 Filosofía Política |
| Sumario: | [EN] This article explores the extent to which our deliberative culture determines our capacity to recognize relevant knowledge, to select and value epistemic authority, or to recognize the importance of individual and/or collective epistemic achievements in a deliberative context. This investigation is especially relevant in a moment in which the formation of public opinion no longer depends exclusively on political parties. This leads to a paradoxical situation in which the diffuse energy issued by the electorate is not easily subjected to the discipline of party-oriented proposals or by media disputes that, despite their projection, may be ignored by many people. Thus, it is unclear in which sense social networks act as an alternative to the traditional system of intermediation set up by trade unions and pressure groups. By combining the approaches of deliberative democracy and social cognition theories, this essay sustains the relevance of what is defined here as ‘cooperative cognition’ in order to face this challenge. |
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