Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge

In this paper I analyse the problem of legal disagreements, initially raised by Ronald Dworkin against Hartian positivism. According to Dworkin, disagreements are pervasive, since law is an argumentative practice in which participants invoke normative arguments. Positivists, who claim that law depen...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10230/72292
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292
https://dx.doi.org/10.4000/revus.3345
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Legal disagreements
Dworkin
Legal positivism
Direct reference theories
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spelling Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challengeRamírez-Ludeña, LorenaLegal disagreementsDworkinLegal positivismDirect reference theoriesIn this paper I analyse the problem of legal disagreements, initially raised by Ronald Dworkin against Hartian positivism. According to Dworkin, disagreements are pervasive, since law is an argumentative practice in which participants invoke normative arguments. Positivists, who claim that law depends upon agreement among officials, have difficulties to make sense of the fact that lawyers frequently disagree. I first present the main arguments in the debate. I then go on to distinguish different levels at which lawyers disagree. Taking these levels into consideration, I articulate a pluralist reply that shows that the fundamental positivist tenets remain untouched by Dworkin's challenge.Klub Revus - Centre for Studies on Democracy and European Constitutionality2026202620162026info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292https://dx.doi.org/10.4000/revus.3345http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésRevus. 2016;(28):11-32.The text only may be used under licence CC BY-SA 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) may be subject to specific use terms.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10230/722922026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
title Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
spellingShingle Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
Legal disagreements
Dworkin
Legal positivism
Direct reference theories
title_short Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
title_full Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
title_fullStr Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
title_full_unstemmed Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
title_sort Legal disagreements: a pluralist reply to Dworkin's challenge
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
author Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
author_facet Ramírez-Ludeña, Lorena
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Legal disagreements
Dworkin
Legal positivism
Direct reference theories
topic Legal disagreements
Dworkin
Legal positivism
Direct reference theories
description In this paper I analyse the problem of legal disagreements, initially raised by Ronald Dworkin against Hartian positivism. According to Dworkin, disagreements are pervasive, since law is an argumentative practice in which participants invoke normative arguments. Positivists, who claim that law depends upon agreement among officials, have difficulties to make sense of the fact that lawyers frequently disagree. I first present the main arguments in the debate. I then go on to distinguish different levels at which lawyers disagree. Taking these levels into consideration, I articulate a pluralist reply that shows that the fundamental positivist tenets remain untouched by Dworkin's challenge.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
2026
2026
2026
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
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status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292
https://dx.doi.org/10.4000/revus.3345
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292
url https://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292
https://dx.doi.org/10.4000/revus.3345
http://hdl.handle.net/10230/72292
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Revus. 2016;(28):11-32.
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Klub Revus - Centre for Studies on Democracy and European Constitutionality
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Klub Revus - Centre for Studies on Democracy and European Constitutionality
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
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