Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions

Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematic...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Pla Planas, Albert, López Ibáñez, Beatriz, Murillo Espinar, Javier
Tipo de recurso: informe técnico
Fecha de publicación:2012
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10256/8026
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Subhastes -- Models matemàtics
Auctions -- Mathematical models
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spelling Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute AuctionsPla Planas, AlbertLópez Ibáñez, BeatrizMurillo Espinar, JavierSubhastes -- Models matemàticsAuctions -- Mathematical modelsProving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of biddersThis research project has been partially funded through the projects labeled TIN2008- 04547 and DPI2011-24929, and BR10/18 Scholarship of the University of Girona granted to Albert PlaUniversitat de Girona. Institut d'Informàtica i Aplicacions2012info:eu-repo/semantics/reportapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026Informes (IIIA)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)Inglésinfo:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//DPI2011-24929info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//TIN2008-04547Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spainhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10256/80262026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
title Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
spellingShingle Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
Pla Planas, Albert
Subhastes -- Models matemàtics
Auctions -- Mathematical models
title_short Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
title_full Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
title_fullStr Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
title_full_unstemmed Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
title_sort Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Pla Planas, Albert
López Ibáñez, Beatriz
Murillo Espinar, Javier
author Pla Planas, Albert
author_facet Pla Planas, Albert
López Ibáñez, Beatriz
Murillo Espinar, Javier
author_role author
author2 López Ibáñez, Beatriz
Murillo Espinar, Javier
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Subhastes -- Models matemàtics
Auctions -- Mathematical models
topic Subhastes -- Models matemàtics
Auctions -- Mathematical models
description Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders
publishDate 2012
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2012
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/report
format report
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026
http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026
url http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//DPI2011-24929
info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/MICINN//TIN2008-04547
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Spain
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universitat de Girona. Institut d'Informàtica i Aplicacions
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universitat de Girona. Institut d'Informàtica i Aplicacions
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Informes (IIIA)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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