Proving Incentive Compatibility in Multi-Attribute Auctions
Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematic...
| Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | informe técnico |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2012 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/8026 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/8026 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Subhastes -- Models matemàtics Auctions -- Mathematical models |
| Sumario: | Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simulations to study the behaviour of bidders |
|---|