Implicaciones semánticas y metafísicas de la atingencia del Principio de no contradicción en Metafísica Γ 4
According to M. Wedin, R. M. Dancy and C. Kirwan, Aristotle does not restrict the range of the Principle of Non-Contradiction to essential sentences about substances. The reason for this is that the Principle lies on the universal character of per se-being and on each thing’s essence. Contrary to th...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/29287 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/29287 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Contradicción Principio Semántica Sustancia |
| Sumario: | According to M. Wedin, R. M. Dancy and C. Kirwan, Aristotle does not restrict the range of the Principle of Non-Contradiction to essential sentences about substances. The reason for this is that the Principle lies on the universal character of per se-being and on each thing’s essence. Contrary to this opinion, I will argue that the PNC is bound to the semantic of substantial predicates. I will analyse two main arguments from Metaphysics Γ 4, and will make explicit some ontological and semantical consequences arising from these arguments. |
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