On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness
We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness)....
| Autores: | , |
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ddd.uab.cat:182481 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ddd.uab.cat/record/182481 https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1111/iere.12266 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Strategy-proofness Single-peakedness Anonymity Unanimity Tops-onlyness Semilattice |
| Resumo: | We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops-onlyness, anonymity and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as semilattice single-peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single-peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well-known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy-proof rules are admissible are semilattice single-peaked domains. |
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