Cooperative games with size-truncated information
We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the so-called Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that t...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/68503 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/68503 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Anàlisi cost-benefici Anàlisi vectorial Càlcul de variacions Cooperative games (Mathematics) Cost effectiveness Vector analysis Calculus of variations |
| Resumo: | We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the so-called Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for nonconsecutive ones. |
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