Open shop scheduling games
This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems to minimize the sum of completion times. We assume that there is an initial schedule to process the jobs (consisting of a number of operations) on the machines and that each job is owned by a different player. Thus, we can...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/186291 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/186291 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Teoria de jocs Cooperative games (Mathematics) Game theory |
| Sumario: | This paper takes a game theoretical approach to open shop scheduling problems to minimize the sum of completion times. We assume that there is an initial schedule to process the jobs (consisting of a number of operations) on the machines and that each job is owned by a different player. Thus, we can associate a cooperative TU-game to any open shop scheduling problem, assigning to each coalition the maximal cost savings it can obtain through admissible rearrangements of jobs' operations. A number of different approaches to admissible schedules for a coalition are introduced and, in the main result of the paper, a core allocation rule is provided for games arising from unit (execution times and weights) open shop scheduling problems for the most of these approaches. To sharpen the bounds of the set of open shop scheduling problems that result in games that are balanced, we provide two counterexamples: one for general open shop problems and another for further relaxations of the definition of admissible rearrangements for a coalition. |
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