An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game

Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their p...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Atay, Ata
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
OAI Identifier:oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/199460
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Teoria de jocs
Assignació de recursos
Àlgebres de Von Neumann
Problema de Neumann
Game theory
Resource allocation
Von Neumann algebras
Neumann problem
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spelling An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment gameAtay, AtaTeoria de jocsAssignació de recursosÀlgebres de Von NeumannProblema de NeumannGame theoryResource allocationVon Neumann algebrasNeumann problemSolymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002.Elsevier B.V.2017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UBinstname:Universidad de BarcelonaInglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001Operations Research Letters, 2017, vol. 45, num. 3, p. 217-219https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/1994602026-05-27T06:46:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
title An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
spellingShingle An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
Atay, Ata
Teoria de jocs
Assignació de recursos
Àlgebres de Von Neumann
Problema de Neumann
Game theory
Resource allocation
Von Neumann algebras
Neumann problem
title_short An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
title_full An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
title_fullStr An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
title_full_unstemmed An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
title_sort An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Atay, Ata
author Atay, Ata
author_facet Atay, Ata
author_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Teoria de jocs
Assignació de recursos
Àlgebres de Von Neumann
Problema de Neumann
Game theory
Resource allocation
Von Neumann algebras
Neumann problem
topic Teoria de jocs
Assignació de recursos
Àlgebres de Von Neumann
Problema de Neumann
Game theory
Resource allocation
Von Neumann algebras
Neumann problem
description Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001
Operations Research Letters, 2017, vol. 45, num. 3, p. 217-219
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.03.001
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2017
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
reponame:Dipòsit Digital de la UB
instname:Universidad de Barcelona
instname_str Universidad de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de la UB
collection Dipòsit Digital de la UB
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.300719

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