An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their p...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositorio: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/199460 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199460 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problem |
| Resumo: | Solymosi and Raghavan (2001), characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. While their proof makes use of graph-theoretical tools, the alternative proof presented here relies on the notion of the buyer-seller exact representative, as introduced by Núñez and Rafels in 2002. |
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