Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument
In his version of the so-called Thomistic objection against the ontological argument, Kant follows Crusius in replacing the term “suffi-cient” for “determining” in the formulation of the ‘principle of reason’ as an attempt to distinguish logical possibility from real possibility more clearly. Howeve...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2026 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Murcia |
| Repositorio: | DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murcia |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digitum.um.es:10201/203622 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.554921 http://hdl.handle.net/10201/203622 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Kant Argumento Ontológico Principio de Razón Ontological Argument Principle of Reason Crusius No relacionado con ningún objetivo de desarrollo sostenible |
| id |
ES_c75d5edbd072f411fa5da002e0ffb93f |
|---|---|
| oai_identifier_str |
oai:digitum.um.es:10201/203622 |
| network_acronym_str |
ES |
| network_name_str |
España |
| repository_id_str |
|
| spelling |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological ArgumentCrusius y el Kant precrítico sobre del Principio de Razón Determinante y el Argumento OntológicoGaray, IgnacioKantArgumento OntológicoPrincipio de RazónOntological ArgumentPrinciple of ReasonCrusiusNo relacionado con ningún objetivo de desarrollo sostenibleIn his version of the so-called Thomistic objection against the ontological argument, Kant follows Crusius in replacing the term “suffi-cient” for “determining” in the formulation of the ‘principle of reason’ as an attempt to distinguish logical possibility from real possibility more clearly. However, their respective reformulations of this principle and the Thomistic objection pre-sent some significant differences. In this paper, I will try to show two things: 1) The main differences between Crusius’ and Kant’s reformulation of the principle of reason. 2) The way in which these differences affect their respective formulations of the objection against the ontological argument.En su versión de la llamada Objeción Tomista contra el argumento ontológico, Kant sigue a Crusius al reemplazar el término “sufi-ciente” por “determinante” en la formulación del ‘principio de razón’ para distinguir más clara-mente la posibilidad lógica de la posibilidad real. Sin embargo, sus respectivas formulaciones de ese principio y de la Objeción Tomista presentan algunas diferencias significativas. En este artículo, trataré de mostrar dos cosas: 1) Las principales diferencias entre las formulaciones del ‘principio de razón’ realizadas por Crusius y por Kant. 2) La forma en que estas diferencias afectan a sus respectivas objeciones contra el argumento ontológico.Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de PublicacionesSin departamento asociado202620262026info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdf16application/pdfhttp://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.554921http://hdl.handle.net/10201/203622reponame:DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murciainstname:Universidad de MurciaInglésSin financiación externa a la UniversidadAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/oai:digitum.um.es:10201/2036222026-05-27T12:40:41Z |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument Crusius y el Kant precrítico sobre del Principio de Razón Determinante y el Argumento Ontológico |
| title |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument |
| spellingShingle |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument Garay, Ignacio Kant Argumento Ontológico Principio de Razón Ontological Argument Principle of Reason Crusius No relacionado con ningún objetivo de desarrollo sostenible |
| title_short |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument |
| title_full |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument |
| title_fullStr |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument |
| title_sort |
Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv |
Garay, Ignacio |
| author |
Garay, Ignacio |
| author_facet |
Garay, Ignacio |
| author_role |
author |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv |
Sin departamento asociado |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv |
Kant Argumento Ontológico Principio de Razón Ontological Argument Principle of Reason Crusius No relacionado con ningún objetivo de desarrollo sostenible |
| topic |
Kant Argumento Ontológico Principio de Razón Ontological Argument Principle of Reason Crusius No relacionado con ningún objetivo de desarrollo sostenible |
| description |
In his version of the so-called Thomistic objection against the ontological argument, Kant follows Crusius in replacing the term “suffi-cient” for “determining” in the formulation of the ‘principle of reason’ as an attempt to distinguish logical possibility from real possibility more clearly. However, their respective reformulations of this principle and the Thomistic objection pre-sent some significant differences. In this paper, I will try to show two things: 1) The main differences between Crusius’ and Kant’s reformulation of the principle of reason. 2) The way in which these differences affect their respective formulations of the objection against the ontological argument. |
| publishDate |
2026 |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2026 2026 2026 |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| format |
article |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.554921 http://hdl.handle.net/10201/203622 |
| url |
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.554921 http://hdl.handle.net/10201/203622 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
Inglés |
| language_invalid_str_mv |
Inglés |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
Sin financiación externa a la Universidad |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| rights_invalid_str_mv |
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
| eu_rights_str_mv |
openAccess |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf 16 application/pdf |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Universidad de Murcia. Servicio de Publicaciones |
| dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murcia instname:Universidad de Murcia |
| instname_str |
Universidad de Murcia |
| reponame_str |
DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murcia |
| collection |
DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murcia |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv |
|
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
|
| _version_ |
1869419150878703616 |
| score |
15.811543 |