Crusius and the Pre-critical Kant on the Principle of Determining Reason and the Ontological Argument
In his version of the so-called Thomistic objection against the ontological argument, Kant follows Crusius in replacing the term “suffi-cient” for “determining” in the formulation of the ‘principle of reason’ as an attempt to distinguish logical possibility from real possibility more clearly. Howeve...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2026 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Murcia |
| Repositorio: | DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murcia |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digitum.um.es:10201/203622 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.554921 http://hdl.handle.net/10201/203622 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Kant Argumento Ontológico Principio de Razón Ontological Argument Principle of Reason Crusius No relacionado con ningún objetivo de desarrollo sostenible |
| Sumario: | In his version of the so-called Thomistic objection against the ontological argument, Kant follows Crusius in replacing the term “suffi-cient” for “determining” in the formulation of the ‘principle of reason’ as an attempt to distinguish logical possibility from real possibility more clearly. However, their respective reformulations of this principle and the Thomistic objection pre-sent some significant differences. In this paper, I will try to show two things: 1) The main differences between Crusius’ and Kant’s reformulation of the principle of reason. 2) The way in which these differences affect their respective formulations of the objection against the ontological argument. |
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