Els drets del sensible: estudi leibnizià
This paper analyzes the Kantian claim that Leibniz had identified the sensibility with the confused representation of things. Section 1 outlines the Kantian perspective in order to discriminate the exact Leibnizian thesis from the consequence that Kant deduces from it, namely the intellectualization...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2001 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/15178 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/15178 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716 Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804 |
| Sumario: | This paper analyzes the Kantian claim that Leibniz had identified the sensibility with the confused representation of things. Section 1 outlines the Kantian perspective in order to discriminate the exact Leibnizian thesis from the consequence that Kant deduces from it, namely the intellectualization of phenomena. Section 2 examines the Leibnizian view, confirmes the main Kantian claim about it and rejects the scholars’ arguments according to which Leibniz had not conflated confused thought with sensibility. Section 3 argues against the second part of the Kantian claim and holds that Leibniz had not intellectualized the phenomena, at least in the sense that Kant understands it |
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