Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions
Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contras...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2010 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repository: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/225639 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/225639 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Vaguetat (Filosofia) Veritat Paradoxa Semàntica (Filosofia) Vagueness (Philosophy) Truth Paradox Semantics (Philosophy) |
| Summary: | Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account. |
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