Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions
Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contras...
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2010 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositório: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/225639 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/225639 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Vaguetat (Filosofia) Veritat Paradoxa Semàntica (Filosofia) Vagueness (Philosophy) Truth Paradox Semantics (Philosophy) |
| Resumo: | Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account. |
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