Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange

We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preference...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
Repositorio:Docta Complutense
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/103811
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103811
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:C71
C78
D71
D78
Pairwise exchange
Individual rationality
Constrained efficiency
Strategy-proofness
Maximal domain
Econometría (Economía)
5302 Econometría
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oai_identifier_str oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/103811
network_acronym_str ES
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repository_id_str
spelling Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchangeRodríguez Álvarez, CarmeloC71C78D71D78Pairwise exchangeIndividual rationalityConstrained efficiencyStrategy-proofnessMaximal domainEconometría (Economía)5302 EconometríaWe analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) that are maximal rich domains for the existence of rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common ranking but for a specific pair of objects.ElsevierUniversidad Complutense de Madrid20232023-11-0120232023-11-01journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501VoRhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103811reponame:Docta Complutenseinstname:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)Inglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/1038112026-06-02T12:44:21Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
title Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
spellingShingle Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
C71
C78
D71
D78
Pairwise exchange
Individual rationality
Constrained efficiency
Strategy-proofness
Maximal domain
Econometría (Economía)
5302 Econometría
title_short Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
title_full Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
title_fullStr Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
title_full_unstemmed Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
title_sort Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
author Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
author_facet Rodríguez Álvarez, Carmelo
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Complutense de Madrid
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv C71
C78
D71
D78
Pairwise exchange
Individual rationality
Constrained efficiency
Strategy-proofness
Maximal domain
Econometría (Economía)
5302 Econometría
topic C71
C78
D71
D78
Pairwise exchange
Individual rationality
Constrained efficiency
Strategy-proofness
Maximal domain
Econometría (Economía)
5302 Econometría
description We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) that are maximal rich domains for the existence of rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common ranking but for a specific pair of objects.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
2023-11-01
2023
2023-11-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
VoR
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103811
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103811
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Docta Complutense
instname:Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
instname_str Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)
reponame_str Docta Complutense
collection Docta Complutense
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,300719

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