Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preference...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/103811 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/103811 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | C71 C78 D71 D78 Pairwise exchange Individual rationality Constrained efficiency Strategy-proofness Maximal domain Econometría (Economía) 5302 Econometría |
| Sumario: | We analyze centralized markets for indivisible objects without money through pairwise exchange when each agent initially owns a single object. We consider rules that for each profile of agents preferences select an assignment of the objects to the agents. We present a family of domains of preferences (minimal reversal domains) that are maximal rich domains for the existence of rules that satisfy individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Each minimal reversal domain is defined by a common ranking of the set of objects, and agents’ preferences over admissible objects coincide with such common ranking but for a specific pair of objects. |
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