On the logical structure of de Finetti's notion of event
This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against s...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión enviada para evaluación y publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) |
| Repositorio: | DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digital.csic.es:10261/131942 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/131942 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | De Finetti's coherence criterion Events Informations frames Choice-based probability Logical structure Probability jel:C02 |
| Sumario: | This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values don't represent decision-relevant quantifications of uncertainty. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. |
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