On the computational security of a distributed key distribution scheme
In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers help a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a non-corrupted group. In this work we formalize the security analy...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2008 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) |
| Repositorio: | DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digital.csic.es:10261/161146 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/161146 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Key distribution Secret sharing schemes Cryptography Provable security |
| Sumario: | In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers help a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a non-corrupted group. In this work we formalize the security analysis of one of such schemes [11] which was not considered in the original proposal. We prove the scheme secure in the random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard to solve. We also detail a possible modification of that scheme and the one in [24] which allows to prove the security of the schemes without assuming that a specific hash function behaves as a random oracle. As usual, this improvement in the security of the schemes is at the cost of an efficiency loss. © 2008 IEEE. |
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