On the computational security of a distributed key distribution scheme
In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers helps a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a noncorrupted group. In this work, we formalize the security anal...
| Autores: | , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2008 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC) |
| Repositorio: | UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/2170 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2117/2170 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Information and Communication Applications, Inc. Cryptography Key distribution Secret sharing schemes Provable security Comunicació Informació Classificació AMS::94 Information And Communication, Circuits::94A Communication, information |
| Resumo: | In a distributed key distribution scheme, a set of servers helps a set of users in a group to securely obtain a common key. Security means that an adversary who corrupts some servers and some users has no information about the key of a noncorrupted group. In this work, we formalize the security analysis of one such scheme [ 11] which was not considered in the original proposal. We prove the scheme is secure in the random oracle model, assuming that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard to solve. We also detail a possible modification of that scheme and the one in [ 24] which allows us to prove the security of the schemes without assuming that a specific hash function behaves as a random oracle. As usual, this improvement in the security of the schemes is at the cost of an efficiency loss. |
|---|