Sellars y los imperativos contrarios al deber
[ENG] This paper discusses the way in which Wilfrid Sellars accounts for contrary-to-duty imperatives. Such imperatives, when interpreted as rules, dictate what must be done if some obligation has not been fulfilled but it is desired that its negative effects are minimised. They we...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2014 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de las Islas Baleares |
| Repositorio: | Biblioteca Digital de les Illes Balears |
| OAI Identifier: | taula:Taula_2014v046p121 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://ibdigital.uib.es/greenstone/sites/oai-site/collect/taula/index/assoc/Taula_20/14v046p1/21.dir/Taula_2014v046p121.pdf http://ibdigital.uib.es/greenstone/library/collection/taula/document/Taula_2014v046p121 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Philosophy Sellars |
| Sumario: | [ENG] This paper discusses the way in which Wilfrid Sellars accounts for contrary-to-duty imperatives. Such imperatives, when interpreted as rules, dictate what must be done if some obligation has not been fulfilled but it is desired that its negative effects are minimised. They were introduced by Chisholm, who argued that they cannot be translated into the language of Standard Deontic Logic. Sellars agrees with Chisholm and claims that in order to formalise them it must be specified under which circumstances they apply. |
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