Managerial concentration, ownership concentration, and firm value: evidence from Spanish SMEs
Various corporate governance theories indicate that governance in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) differs to that of larger corporations due to the ownership-management function within the organizational structure. This article provides empirical evidence of enhanced firm value in a sample...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid |
| Repositorio: | Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/710871 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10486/710871 https://dx.doi.org/10.26784/sbir.v7i1.541 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Firm value Managerial concentration Ownership concentration Corporate governance Alternative stock exchange Economía |
| Sumario: | Various corporate governance theories indicate that governance in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) differs to that of larger corporations due to the ownership-management function within the organizational structure. This article provides empirical evidence of enhanced firm value in a sample of listed SMEs resulting from certain corporate governance mechanisms related to managerial and ownership concentration. The empirical analysis conducted in this paper is based on a panel data set consisting of 108 small and medium-sized public firms on the Spanish alternative stock exchange over a time frame of five years (2015-2019). The results suggest that CEO duality, the controlling shareholders, and the second largest shareholders all improve firm value. Conversely, the ratio of independent directors has a negative impact on firm value. These findings are robust to alternative model specifications such as dynamic panel estimators (Generalized Method of Moments -GMM-) and instrumental variable methods. Overall, we show that the governance configuration of listed SMEs can mitigate several of the central issues, such as agency problems, that large corporations face |
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