Coacción en el derecho y razón práctica. Las limitaciones del positivismo jurídico en un texto de Frederick Schauer
In a recent book (<em>The Force of Law</em>), Frederick Schauer –American philosopher of law–, tries to justify a return to the original version of positivism in law: the one elaborated by Bentham and Austin, which reduces the law to imperatives with the threaten of a sanction in case of...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/60528 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/60528 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | positivismo sanciones fuerza reductivismo Bentham Austin Hart |
| Sumario: | In a recent book (<em>The Force of Law</em>), Frederick Schauer –American philosopher of law–, tries to justify a return to the original version of positivism in law: the one elaborated by Bentham and Austin, which reduces the law to imperatives with the threaten of a sanction in case of non-compliance. From this point of view, Schauer criticizes Hart and his followers, as well as the natural law thinkers, and proposes a positivist-reducing conception of law, but with a broader conception of “sanction”. The autor of the article criticizes Schauer’s view from many perspectives, mainly because the reductivism found in his ideas. |
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