Secondary rule of recognition: from the imperativism of John Austin and to the positivism of Herbert Hart
Legal positivism has been predominantly taught and applied for decades by professionals in the Brazilian legal area, generally with reference to the theoretical construction of Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), leaving aside many other studies that offer important formulations and concepts for the understand...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2023 |
| País: | Brasil |
| Institución: | Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) |
| Repositorio: | Veritas (Porto Alegre. Online) |
| Idioma: | portugués |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br:article/41716 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/veritas/article/view/41716 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | recognition rule impertivism positivism John Austin Herbert Hart regra de reconhecimento imperativismo regla de reconocimiento positivismo Herbert Hart. |
| Sumario: | Legal positivism has been predominantly taught and applied for decades by professionals in the Brazilian legal area, generally with reference to the theoretical construction of Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), leaving aside many other studies that offer important formulations and concepts for the understanding of contemporary Law. This article joins a few researches on other theoretical references about legal positivism, analyzing the recognition rule in the theoretical thought of Herbert Hart (1907-1992), presenting it as an increase and overcoming of the imperative theory of John Austin (1790- 1859). Based on a bibliographical research, we show that, in Hart, the recognition rule (secondary rule modality) is indispensable for the certainty necessary to the Law, as well as to assess the validity of the legal system. |
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