On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked p...

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Autores: Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041, Moreno de Barreda, Inés|||0009-0007-2968-8143
Formato: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2011
País:España
Recursos:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Repositorio:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:ddd.uab.cat:143785
Acesso em linha:https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143785
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Elecció social
Strategy-proofness
Single-peaked preferences
Median voter
Feasibility constraints
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spelling On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakednessMassó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041Moreno de Barreda, Inés|||0009-0007-2968-8143Elecció socialStrategy-proofnessSingle-peaked preferencesMedian voterFeasibility constraintsWe characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints. 22011-01-0120112011-01-01Articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501SMURhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://ddd.uab.cat/record/143785https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001reponame:Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UABinstname:Universitat Autònoma de BarcelonaInglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Aquest material està protegit per drets d'autor i/o drets afins. Podeu utilitzar aquest material en funció del que permet la legislació de drets d'autor i drets afins d'aplicació al vostre cas. Per a d'altres usos heu d'obtenir permís del(s) titular(s) de drets.https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:ddd.uab.cat:1437852026-06-06T12:50:31Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
title On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
spellingShingle On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Elecció social
Strategy-proofness
Single-peaked preferences
Median voter
Feasibility constraints
title_short On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
title_full On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
title_fullStr On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
title_full_unstemmed On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
title_sort On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Moreno de Barreda, Inés|||0009-0007-2968-8143
author Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
author_facet Massó, Jordi|||0000-0003-3712-0041
Moreno de Barreda, Inés|||0009-0007-2968-8143
author_role author
author2 Moreno de Barreda, Inés|||0009-0007-2968-8143
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Elecció social
Strategy-proofness
Single-peaked preferences
Median voter
Feasibility constraints
topic Elecció social
Strategy-proofness
Single-peaked preferences
Median voter
Feasibility constraints
description We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin, 1980) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.
publishDate 2011
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2
2011-01-01
2011
2011-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
SMUR
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dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
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https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
url https://ddd.uab.cat/record/143785
https://dx.doi.org/urn:doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.12.001
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
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eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
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instname:Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
instname_str Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
reponame_str Dipòsit Digital de Documents de la UAB
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