Prueba libre, justificación epistémica y el noble sueño de los estándares de prueba
To establish objective standards of proof for the guidance of judicial decisions is one of the greatest yearnings of legal epistemology. Among the proposals, one of the most well-received seems to be that of those who suggest fixing the standards by using parameters of epistemic justification. This...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2020 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:10256/18824 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10256/18824 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Prova (Dret) Evidence (Law) |
| Sumario: | To establish objective standards of proof for the guidance of judicial decisions is one of the greatest yearnings of legal epistemology. Among the proposals, one of the most well-received seems to be that of those who suggest fixing the standards by using parameters of epistemic justification. This paper argues that this enterprise is unfeasible, making explicit the reasons for this unfeasibility. In any case, a revaluation of these proposals is suggested even if with a more circumscribed utility |
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