An agreeable collusive equilibrium in differential games with asymmetric players
We study a class of collusive equilibria in differential games with asymmetric players discounting the future at different rates. For such equilibria, at each moment, weights of players can depend on the state of the system. To fix them, we propose using a bargaining procedure according to which pla...
| Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Status: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Publication Date: | 2020 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/146689 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/146689 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Jocs diferencials Equilibri (Economia) Simetria (Matemàtica) Dinàmica Differential games Equilibrium (Economics) Symmetry (Mathematics) Dynamics |
| Summary: | We study a class of collusive equilibria in differential games with asymmetric players discounting the future at different rates. For such equilibria, at each moment, weights of players can depend on the state of the system. To fix them, we propose using a bargaining procedure according to which players can bargain again at every future moment. By choosing as threat point the feedback noncooperative outcome, the corresponding solution, if it exists, is agreeable. An exhaustible resource game illustrates the results. |
|---|