A time consistent dynamic bargaining procedure in differential games with heterogeneous discounting
We study cooperative solutions for differential games where players consume a common property resource. Players are asymmetric, in the sense that they have different preferences and, in particular, different time preferences. We propose a new time-consistent dynamic bargaining procedure for this cla...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositorio: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/179057 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/179057 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Jocs diferencials Equilibri (Economia) Simetria (Matemàtica) Dinàmica Differential games Equilibrium (Economics) Symmetry (Mathematics) Dynamics |
| Sumario: | We study cooperative solutions for differential games where players consume a common property resource. Players are asymmetric, in the sense that they have different preferences and, in particular, different time preferences. We propose a new time-consistent dynamic bargaining procedure for this class of games. This solution concept, which is de ned as the time-consistent dynamic bargaining (TCB) solution, extends the recursive Nash bargaining solution introduced in Sorger (2006) to a continuous time setting. The underlying idea is that, in case of disagreement, the threat is that players will play a noncooperative Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium just during a very small period of time, since new negotiations can take place at every future moment and, in particular, immediately later. Conditions for interior TCB solutions are derived. To illustrate the results, two common property resource games are analyzed in detail. |
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