On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games

We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Atay, Ata, Solymosi, Tamás
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2018
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/199370
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Negociació
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Teoria de jocs
Negotiation
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Game theory
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spelling On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer gamesAtay, AtaSolymosi, TamásNegociacióJocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)Teoria de jocsNegotiationCooperative games (Mathematics)Game theoryWe study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).Elsevier B.V.2023202320182023info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion5 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 167, p. 99-103https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1993702026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
title On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
spellingShingle On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
Atay, Ata
Negociació
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Teoria de jocs
Negotiation
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Game theory
title_short On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
title_full On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
title_fullStr On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
title_full_unstemmed On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
title_sort On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Atay, Ata
Solymosi, Tamás
author Atay, Ata
author_facet Atay, Ata
Solymosi, Tamás
author_role author
author2 Solymosi, Tamás
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Negociació
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Teoria de jocs
Negotiation
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Game theory
topic Negociació
Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Teoria de jocs
Negotiation
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Game theory
description We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).
publishDate 2018
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018
2023
2023
2023
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022
Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 167, p. 99-103
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2018
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 5 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier B.V.
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.812429

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