Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice

The concept of testimonial injustice (TI) has been expanded considerably since Fricker’s groundbreaking original formulation. Testimonial void (TV), as well as other kinds of TI identified in the last decade, encourage the idea that the virtue of testimonial justice (TJ) is not the appropriate remed...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Carmona Escalera, Carla
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:España
Recursos:Universidad de Sevilla (US)
Repositorio:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
OAI Identifier:oai:idus.us.es:11441/148403
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/11441/148403
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.48
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Epistemic engagement
Testimonial injustice
Epistemic interaction
Virtue of testimonial justice
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spelling Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injusticeCarmona Escalera, CarlaEpistemic engagementTestimonial injusticeEpistemic interactionVirtue of testimonial justiceThe concept of testimonial injustice (TI) has been expanded considerably since Fricker’s groundbreaking original formulation. Testimonial void (TV), as well as other kinds of TI identified in the last decade, encourage the idea that the virtue of testimonial justice (TJ) is not the appropriate remedy to battle against injustice in our testimonial exchanges. This paper contributes to the existing literature on the limitations of TJ as the remedy for TI by drawing attention to its shortcomings in the context of other kinds of TI. By contrast, I propose further engaging epistemically with the other (EE) as a corrective to injustice in our testimonial exchanges. I understand EE as a practice in which information regarding epistemic injustice, strategies to fight it and skills training play the leading roles. If the problem lies in lack of appropriate epistemic interaction between knowers, we need to train ourselves to do what we fail to do. Given that we are in the domain of testimony, EE essentially amounts to engaging further with the other in conversation. In the process, EE sheds light on the need for second-order change to fight TI, as enacting EE would require the transformation of our concepts of testimony and credibility.Cambridge University PressMetafísica y Corrientes Actuales de la Filosofía, Ética y Filosofía Política2022info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/11441/148403https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.48reponame:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevillainstname:Universidad de Sevilla (US)InglésEpisteme, 21 (3), 871-900.https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.48info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:idus.us.es:11441/1484032026-06-17T12:51:07Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice
title Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice
spellingShingle Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice
Carmona Escalera, Carla
Epistemic engagement
Testimonial injustice
Epistemic interaction
Virtue of testimonial justice
title_short Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice
title_full Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice
title_fullStr Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice
title_full_unstemmed Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice
title_sort Engaging epistemically with the other: Toward a more dialogical and plural understanding of the remedy for testimonial injustice
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Carmona Escalera, Carla
author Carmona Escalera, Carla
author_facet Carmona Escalera, Carla
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Metafísica y Corrientes Actuales de la Filosofía, Ética y Filosofía Política
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Epistemic engagement
Testimonial injustice
Epistemic interaction
Virtue of testimonial justice
topic Epistemic engagement
Testimonial injustice
Epistemic interaction
Virtue of testimonial justice
description The concept of testimonial injustice (TI) has been expanded considerably since Fricker’s groundbreaking original formulation. Testimonial void (TV), as well as other kinds of TI identified in the last decade, encourage the idea that the virtue of testimonial justice (TJ) is not the appropriate remedy to battle against injustice in our testimonial exchanges. This paper contributes to the existing literature on the limitations of TJ as the remedy for TI by drawing attention to its shortcomings in the context of other kinds of TI. By contrast, I propose further engaging epistemically with the other (EE) as a corrective to injustice in our testimonial exchanges. I understand EE as a practice in which information regarding epistemic injustice, strategies to fight it and skills training play the leading roles. If the problem lies in lack of appropriate epistemic interaction between knowers, we need to train ourselves to do what we fail to do. Given that we are in the domain of testimony, EE essentially amounts to engaging further with the other in conversation. In the process, EE sheds light on the need for second-order change to fight TI, as enacting EE would require the transformation of our concepts of testimony and credibility.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format article
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/11441/148403
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.48
url https://hdl.handle.net/11441/148403
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.48
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Episteme, 21 (3), 871-900.
https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2022.48
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cambridge University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cambridge University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
instname:Universidad de Sevilla (US)
instname_str Universidad de Sevilla (US)
reponame_str idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
collection idUS. Depósito de Investigación de la Universidad de Sevilla
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,300719

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