El convencionalismo jurídico o la irrelevancia del juspositivismo
Assuming Juan Carlos Bayon’s thesis that the so-called ‘deep conventionalism’ is the minimum content of legal positivism, this paper argues that positivism cannot be valid, even under this ‘thin’ conception, due to the difficulties of maintaning a strong difference between correction and convention...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Navarra |
| Repositorio: | Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/60470 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10171/60470 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | positivismo jurídico convencionalismo neoconstitucionalismo |
| Sumario: | Assuming Juan Carlos Bayon’s thesis that the so-called ‘deep conventionalism’ is the minimum content of legal positivism, this paper argues that positivism cannot be valid, even under this ‘thin’ conception, due to the difficulties of maintaning a strong difference between correction and convention within moral constructivism, which underlies the legal theory of neoconstitutionalism. |
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