Exactly why are slurs wrong?
This article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantian...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Murcia |
| Repositorio: | DIGITUM. Depósito Digital Institucional de la Universidad de Murcia |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digitum.um.es:10201/142522 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon.360561 http://hdl.handle.net/10201/142522 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Dignity Harm Immorality Racial epithets Relationality Slurs Dignidad Daño Inmoralidad Insultos Raciales Relacionalidad CDU::1 - Filosofía y psicología |
| Sumario: | This article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages. |
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