A partisan explanation of political monetary cycles
This paper develops a political monetary model based on partisanship and commitment arguments that explains the likely existence of expansionary monetary policy in pre-election periods irrespective of the incumbent party and of permanent partisan differences in monetary policy. The approach taken is...
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| Tipo de recurso: | informe técnico |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1994 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) |
| Repositorio: | Docta Complutense |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:docta.ucm.es:20.500.14352/64147 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/64147 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Política monetaria Partidos políticos Modelo político. Elecciones Partidos y grupos políticos Planificación económica 5905.01 Elecciones 5905.06 Partidos Políticos 5307.09 Teoría de la Planificación Económica |
| Sumario: | This paper develops a political monetary model based on partisanship and commitment arguments that explains the likely existence of expansionary monetary policy in pre-election periods irrespective of the incumbent party and of permanent partisan differences in monetary policy. The approach taken is to incorporate the option that political parties elaborate electoral economic programs into a rational partisan electoral model. Our results are consistent with the recent empírical findings of Alesina, Cahen, and Roubini (1992, 1993) for a sample including three decades in 18 OECD economies but without relying on opportinistic governmental behavior. |
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